Identity and Behavior of Middle and Great Powers

This academic essay was written for a school paper assignment in grad school. 

The conventional way of thinking about global politics that is focused on realism and liberalism has taken a novel lens in making sense of the contemporary dynamics of states. From the usual balance of power and interdependence, the globe has considered the utility of identity as a powerful concept to explain the behavior and relationship of states. In this essay, I will support the contention that the way states view and understand their security identities influence their interaction with other states. The manifestation of this has been evident in Asia-Pacific, particularly in the ASEAN region. To substantiate, I will explore the security identities of major state players in the region. I will focus on China and Japan vis-à-vis ASEAN and the US. I will also discuss their behavior in the ASEAN region and the general implication of this interaction.

         In the past decades, the volatile changes and development in the ASEAN region have called global attention. Recognizing ASEAN’s potentials, external states with various interests have flocked to the region as a result. Notwithstanding the presence of Russia, India, Iran, and other middle and great powers, China and Japan are among the states with a noticeable presence. Expectedly, the hegemon United States has also been a key player in the region. These major powers share one common feature: all of them are threatened and in serious pursuit of survival. What sets them apart though is their distinct security identities. To illustrate, China’s identity as a rising power threatens to shake the status quo. As Mersheimer (2004) argues, this communist state views foreign forces as potential threats to them.  As a challenger of US predominance, China’s identity is enhanced by its strategic location, size, growing economy, and the strength of its military. The security identity of China is further influenced by domestic pressures (e.g. Xinjian, Hong Kong, etc.). Driven by its wangdao philosophy, China considers itself as a benevolent and humane authority that will change the game for the better. In addition, gifted with strong economic capabilities, China has the capacity to extend its reach to neighboring regions.

On the other hand, the strategy and security identity of Japan is largely defined by the United States-Japan alliance. As discussed by Green (2003), this close alliance has afflicted Japan with the dilemma of entrapment and abandonment where its political and military agency is contingent to the United States. The provision of Article 9 to ban arms and war significantly shapes Japan’s security identity. Japan is mandated to take a non-violent and non-aggressive course of action. To be specific, establishing its own standing military is next to impossible with the current constitutional provision which justifies the reliance to the US.

Consistent with their respective security identities, these states behave accordingly. For China, it maximizes the power disparity between itself and other states that are deemed to impede its goals. As seen in present times, China as a rising great power has expanded her influence to other regions. Guided by wangdao, it continues to desire geopolitical control over its chosen regions while trying to win acceptance. While pursuing its economic objectives and modernizing its military might, it remains cautious not to stand out too much and be hammered down by the US and her allies. Unsure of United States’ intentions, it tiptoes around managing its apprehensive foreign policy vis-à-vis the US and other major powers in the region.

In contrast, pacifist Japan’s unsecured identity is further triggered by the changing security environment of her neighbors. Particularly, the ambivalence of China and North Korea has rattled Japan’s sense of security leaving it to push efforts for an autonomous military. With only defense and dependence on the US-Japan alliance, Japan has opted to behave more peacefully towards other countries by strengthening security relationship, economic ties, diplomacy, and foreign aid over the past years. Still, the persistent domestic and international pressure to revise the constitution for Japan to move beyond alliance and take more independent defensive capabilities have progressed gradually. Yet, the Yoshida doctrine has proven its principles to be resilient over the challenges in the past decades which greatly sustains Japan’s identity and subsequent behavior.

The likely stage for the manifestation of China and Japan’s security identity and behavior center on the geoeconomic competition in the Southeast Asia region thru the construction of development and infrastructure projects. For example, building connectivity ventures such as high-speed railways have been the focus of competition among the two countries. China as a great power has poured remarkable economic and infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. Most notable of all, the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been one of China’s approaches to expand her influence. Gong (2018) contends that consistent with China’s identity, BRI plus the forging economic engagement and free trade agreement is expected to enhance China’s supremacy. As a strategic region for the Maritime Silk Road, Southeast Asia has become China’s testing ground in its effort to widen her reach. In return of these economic and infrastructural endowments, regional states are more inclined to rely on China economically. This is likely to lead to an asymmetric relationship where China will grab opportunities to shift its economic power into political power.

Not far behind, Japan, a long-time sponsor of infrastructure projects, has further advanced its efforts in an attempt to provide more options for the ASEAN member states and even out the playing field with China. Following its identity as a generous donor, Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure is a direct response to foster economic integration and close developmental gaps in the ASEAN region. Thru the longstanding Asian Development Bank, pacifist Japan consolidated quality development projects by implementing hard and soft connectivity programs. Noteworthy, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy of the US, Japan, and other countries has appealed to ASEAN. As observed by Zhao (2018), this rivalry between important powers has caused both negative and positive effects for the ASEAN states.

Consequently, the security identities and behaviors of big powers as played out in the ASEAN region is guaranteed to promote power competition. These key player states will continue to pursue their interests which will intensify the rivalry. The rise of Beijing will continue to face the resistance of the US and her allies, as Nathan and Scobell (2012) noted.  Middle and great powers are expected to relentlessly push their agendas and offset any threat even at the cost of slight skirmishes. However, this is not to imply that the future is doomed to dystopia. As the undisputed hegemon, the US will go to great lengths to keep its superior position in the global order. With alliance, partnerships, multilateralism, and diplomacy, a peaceful ASEAN region (and the world) is still in the cards to persist. Ironic as it may sound but the presence of nuclear weapon still works its deterrent magic. Ikenberry (2014) supported that with the principle of assured destruction, these major power states are less likely to engage in war. In addition, Xuetong (2019) asserted that there will be an uneasy peace where states will strengthen their military but remain mindful to handle tensions in a diplomatic manner. The continuing rivalry will largely be carried out in the economic and technological arena. Hence, it is logical to expect that China, Japan, and US polarity will encourage a more flexible two-track foreign policy (i.e. issue-specific) with smaller states.

Indeed, security identity has an undeniable utility in explaining the world. Each state has its own unique identity that guides its behavior. The case of China as a challenger of hegemony is different from Japan’s inclination to pacifist action. These variations in identity are exhibited blatantly in the ASEAN region. With the United States lingering around, competition is further exaggerated. But this is not to say that military war is iron casted; the competition will focus on other matters. This dynamics will likely persist as long as the salience of states’ security identities is understood and construed accordingly. Nevertheless, identity is real and it matters in global politics.

*This essay was submitted as a requirement for POS 190 (International Relations).

*Still on the process of editing to avoid plagiarism. References are listed in the original file.