The ASEAN Way: Going Beyond Balance and Bandwagon

This academic essay was written for a school paper assignment in grad school. 

Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has evolved into a central institution that upholds the values of cooperation and unity in the region. It has carried out multilateral actions consistent with its mandate in “promoting growth, social progress, and cultural development”. This has greatly benefited the 10 member states. However, despite the prominence of “the ASEAN way”, a significant number of scholars have recently questioned its legitimacy in managing regional issues, especially security problems. Being one of the stages for competition between great powers, ASEAN is caught in a dilemma that will make or break its centrality, and loyalty to its purpose. In this essay, I will explore what does the future hold for ASEAN. I will investigate the alternative strategies ASEAN has taken vis-a-vis unyielding great powers and the ways to fortify its multilateral pillars as it moves forward to restore its former glory and regain the trust of its principal constituents—the Southeast Asian people.

Just like other multilateral institutions, ASEAN has its inherent strengths and weaknesses in relation to the balance of power dynamics in the region. The diverse ASEAN has an aggregated powers of its member states which it can leverage on to deal with external institutions. Its multilateral nature makes it stronger and powerful against enemies. Not to mention, the strong presence of allied great powers has reinforced its balancing force against “revisionist” threats like China. As a facilitator of cooperation, it has continued engaging in multilateral initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum to countervail China’s threat, and ASEAN Plus Three with China, Japan, and South Korea as an institutional balancing response to US and Western powers. The internal balancing of power has also been very effective. Throughout the years, ASEAN was able to keep in check its member states.

On one hand, the weakness of ASEAN vis-à-vis power balance is common knowledge. It does not have an adequate military and economic power, to start with. ASEAN’s economic, political, and social diversity further exacerbates its vulnerability. This defect is taken advantage of by great powers intending to shake ASEAN’s balancing confidence. For instance, China has been notorious to destabilize the firm foundation of ASEAN. As described by Thu (2019), China’s dual strategy on coercion and inducement greatly diminish ASEAN’s bargaining power. The magnitude of China’s strategy has an enduring psychological impact among the constituent states as witnessed in their self-restraining behavior. With varying interests, ASEAN’s balancing of power is eroded by China’s continuous economic bribery and intimidation. The member states’ contrasting discernment of interests, threat perception, benefit gains, and security calculation heighten tension and discord. For instance, Cambodia with its self-serving interests has repeatedly blocked decisions concerning China which sows the seed of disunity and mutual distrust among the network. Unfortunately, ASEAN states’ need for foreign investment, market access, and infrastructure make it difficult to resist great powers’ bids. In addition, the volatile domestic structure of ASEAN’s integral states is a key deciding factor in collective balancing decisions. Domestic leaders have priorities and interests that might change when a new leader is elected. Due to all these, the consequent disunity thwarts any potential for effective balancing of power in the region.

However, the political agency of ASEAN is not limited to traditional realist balance and bandwagon options. In the past decades, the network was able to manage regional issues through consultation, consensus building, and quiet diplomacy. What makes ASEAN exceptional includes the range of strategies its individual member states take and the collective alternative strategies it initiates. One of these strategies is institutional hedging where ASEAN itself plays a crucial role in facilitating equilibrium against threatening external powers. Take the response to assertive and expansionist China, for example. ASEAN attempts to offset this by discouraging bilateral talks and pursuing multilateral approaches. He (2006) posited that institutional realism best describes ASEAN’s unique role in safeguarding its member states. This relatively new school of thought rooted from neoliberalism and neorealism considers institution as mediating body that links state power and foreign policy. With this, states can opt to rely on a regional body to balance on its behalf. ASEAN is an avenue where member states can pool its resource. In other words, ASEAN is more than the individual sum of its parts that invigorate it to respond to perceived threats. Moreover, the network provides states an opportunity to participate in rule-based balancing where norm and agenda setting are honored. This special feature of ASEAN allows it to balance both internal and external threats which are both mutually reinforcing. That is, a stable internal interaction leads to a stronger coherence of ASEAN which makes it threat-proof from external pressures. As a result, cooperation and collaboration are guaranteed as by-products that balance and bandwagon cannot sufficiently explain.

Clearly, the prospect of a multilateral institution ASEAN as argued by different political scholars is both optimistic and pessimistic. While some such as Thu is more inclined to view the future of ASEAN as bleak, others such He and Xuetong are more hopeful for a brighter ASEAN. Zooming into Xuetong (2019), his framing of the prospect for ASEAN is more realistic but not necessarily pessimistic. He argued that the future of global politics will be an uneasy peace—military build-up will still continue but the major arena for the competition will be mostly economic and technological. Similarly, He contends that ASEAN will remain functional in balancing both internal and external challenges. She added a limitation that the current ASEAN is incompatible in solving issues related to non-state actors. Thu, in contrast, holds that China’s coercion and inducement will be powerful to weaken the core of ASEAN.

Moving forward, should ASEAN wish to strengthen its pillars, it is crucial to be open for some slight and major changes. First, given the repeated blocking of Cambodia regarding the South China Sea, there must be an institutional reform, especially on the way the representatives make decisions. The consensus required to decide on the action of ASEAN regarding its individual member states and its collective welfare should be reviewed. Second, given its non-interference principle that makes it futile in addressing non-state centered issues such as terrorism, ASEAN must register these assorted non-state crimes as transnational responsibilities. This will enable the regional group to take collective action and deploy regional forces to capture perpetrators of such crimes. Third, recognizing China’s economic and infrastructural inducement to Cambodia to be a Trojan horse, this must be addressed by providing the country with appealing options better than China’s rewards. For example, the effort of Japan to entice Cambodia with better infrastructure deals should be reinforced. Fourth, as a collective group, ASEAN must have the firm political will in carrying out decisions against perceived adversaries. It must resist compromised temptations that will have dire consequences on its future as a multilateral institution. Fifth, given its weak economic and military capacity, it must continue to forge reliable alliances with big powers. Partnership and agreements with these big powers should be carried out in the name of the collective ASEAN, not just individual bilateral agreements. It must leverage on its useful and unique institutional balancing as prescribed by institutional realism.  

ASEAN has come a long way since 1967. In spite of challenges that diminished its collective image and acceptability, it can change the course of its direction with a stronger political will and commitment. Acknowledging its strengths and weaknesses is a start for a better transformation. Most importantly, with its special institutional balancing gift, ASEAN can maximize its internal and external checking of powers. ASEAN should strike a prudent balance between coping up with the volatile changes of global politics and staying true to its promise to serve the ASEAN people. Perhaps that’s the real essence of “the ASEAN way”—to protect and respect the dignity of its people.

*This essay was submitted as a requirement for POS 190 (International Relations).

*Still on the process of editing to avoid plagiarism. References are listed in the original file.