Revisiting the Tajikistan Peace Process: A Success or Failure?

This academic essay was written for a school paper assignment in grad school. 

Introduction

            The case of Tajikistan is a prominent example of a rapid escalation of civil war that ended within a few years. Starting in 1992 following independence, the war came to a halt by 1997 with the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. Most scholars and practitioners commend the swift resolution and durable peace achieved after the agreement (Lynch, 2007). In fact, it garnered a score of 76% from the Peace Accords Matrix (Kroc Institutte, 2015). However, there had been criticisms about the challenging implementation of the agreed provisions (Smith, 2010; Luther, 2017). This controversy in literature deserves a scholarly effort to add to the comprehensive analysis of the Inter-Tajik peace process after more than two decades.

            The main intention of this paper is to critically understand the “whats, whys, and hows” of the Tajikistan peace process. It seeks to compare the process with selected variables. In this paper, the author briefly maps the conflict to illustrate the dynamics, history, and actors. This is followed by the procedural, substantive, and contextual analysis of the peace process. The modality of the negotiation is detailed; some provisions of the General Agreement are unpacked and examined. Special emphasis is assigned to the place and role of the international community (i.e. the United Nations, neighboring states), and other local stakeholders while linking them to theories of inclusion/exclusion. Lastly, a separate section is dedicated to the unorthodox Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation (DDR) provision, and its implication during the post-agreement period.

Conflict Analysis

            The civil war in Tajikistan commenced shortly after it achieved independence from the former Soviet Union. Questions of legitimacy arose after a former Community Party member, Emomali Rahmonov was elected to lead the state. This triggered opposition and formation of armed factions that desired to direct the future of a fledgling state. Formed through a coalition of political parties (i.e. Islamic Revival Party, Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and Lali Badakhan) with different motives and ideologies, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) led by Said Abdullo Nuri spearheaded the military movements against the government. Largely based in the South, UTO and its members share the sentiment of breaking away to any Soviet legacy which was associated with the existing government. The mixed interests of UTO included the restoration of the Tajik nation, language and culture (Akbarzadeh, 1996); political reforms favoring democracy (Atkin, 1997); and Islamicist societal system (Olcott, 1993). The incumbent communist regime and its supporters were clear in their intention to maintain the secular status quo. Hence, seemingly incompatible goals existed.

            At the outset, it was clear that the civil war was not about seceding territories for independence; it was a conflict for greater autonomy (Abdullaev & Barned, 2001). Ethno-political dimension was not a prominent issue compared to other post-Soviet conflicts. Instead, it was a war of elites to secure power at the republic level to usher the future of the state (Abdullaev & Barned, 2001; Roy, 2006). It was a struggle of regional clans to govern the state, its resources, and define Tajikistan’s path (Collins, 2009). These regional clans took advantage of the instability to advance their interest using ideologies as their container (Djalili, Grare, & Akiner, 1999). The physical geography marked with high mountainous terrains strengthened regional divisions and contradictions (Jonson, 2006). Dissatisfaction developed as economic and political discrimination against these regional groups became more prevalent (Jawad & Tadjbakhsh, 1995). In retrospect, the main source of the civil war was the tenacity of the parties to opt violence with regards to their own power and that of the enemy against a “structural, process-related and network-related” backdrop (Tuncer-Kilavuz, 2011). This is combined with a fragile Tajik nationality and falling institutional structures following the Soviet Union fall. Indeed, the economic and political breakdown of Soviet combined with high unemployment and demographic upsurge played a crucial role (Foroughi, 2010). It left a weak Tajikistan state without an effective government to deal with internal security threats (Rubin, 1998). Devoid of counterbalance and effective mechanisms to suppress competitions, the war rapidly escalated.

The intervention of neighboring actors had an important role in the war. The supporting militias of the government received support from Russia and Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan which provided military training and equipment (Bohr, 1998). Both wanted to revive the political framework of the Soviets with an alliance with elites—Leninabad and Kulob. On the other hand, the United Tajik Opposition enjoyed the support of leaders from northern Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Throughout the violent period, increasing mistrust and tension heightened animosity. This translated to mutual killing including unarmed innocent civilians. The number of reported casualties vary but an estimated 20 000-40 000 people were slaughtered, 600 000 were internally displaced, and more or less 100 000 Tajiks sought refuge neighboring countries (Deng, 1996). Hostilities waned and waxed as parties reached momentary stalemates. Finally, after a series of negotiations, the warring parties decided to sign the 1997 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. This accord laid the foundation of a new Tajikistan that brought hope (and despair) in the following years. Was the peace process a success or a failure? In the succeeding section, the Tajikistan conflict resolution process is examined thoroughly.

Peace Process

            By June 1997 in Moscow, Rakhmonov and Nuri signed the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. Prior to the signing, it took over a year for preparatory consultations. This was followed by a series of shuttle negotiations held to encourage an environment of “confidentiality, trust, and efficiency” (Abdullaev & Barned, 2001). The Inter-Tajik Negotiations conducted its first round in Moscow in April 1994 under UN auspices (Zviagelskaya, 1997). This set an initial comprehensive agenda on a political settlement, refugees and internally displaced persons, and the structural arrangements of the government. The second round was held in Tehran in June. The concern of this round was on a ceasefire. Although it was signed, military operations of UTO continued within the country. In response to this problematic agreement, another round was held in Islamabad in October 1994 where the Joint Commission for Monitoring of ceasefire was established. Despite the presence of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), the parties continued to violate the ceasefire agreement. By 1995, the fourth round took place in Almaty. Although empty of substantive progress, the parties opened the discussion on power-sharing between them. In the end, this round agreed on matters of prisoners’ exchange, and return and repatriation of refugees and IDPs. The military struggle intensified while further meetings of Rakhmonov and Nuri ensued. The signing of the Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan proved to be a vital phase. This blueprint opened up more substantive discussions on modalities of disarmament, power-sharing quotas, settlement, integration, universal amnesty, among others. Internal and external factors had been instrumental in the compromise of the warring parties which eventually led to the final agreement.

Substantially, the content of the agreement was arguably comprehensive. One of the significant outputs of the agreement is the creation of the Commission of National Reconciliation (CNR). Composed of government and UTO members, this ad hoc transitional committee was supported by the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to run the execution of the agreement, recommend constitutional amendments and legislation. CNR formed sub-commissions that operated to deal with the allocation of 30% government positions; manage the welfare of IDPs and refugees; supervise the provision on amnesty, prisoners of war and new electoral regulations; and to oversee the issues concerning the military. The final agreement had an exhaustive list of provisions (see Peace Accords Matrix) but the ones mentioned above were the priorities during that period.

Despite the impasses during the negotiations, the Inter-Tajik peace process achieved a finality due to some circumstances. Both parties were gradually running out of supplies and resources to extend the fighting. With the years of fighting and stalemate, UTO and the government grew weary of the situation. Another essential event was the seize of the Taliban in adjacent Afghanistan. This invoked fear among the parties on the statehood of Tajikistan. Also, UTO’s moderate nature contributed to the bargaining process. A sensible UTO was seen by its constituents and negotiating delegations as a legitimate representative advocating for “equal representation, human and civil rights, Tajik sovereignty and constitutional amendments” (Lynch, 2007). Lastly, the military might of UTO combined with the shifting of foreign policy support of Russia and Central Asian alliances pressured Rakhmonov to compromise (Dov, 2000).

The case of Tajikistan is a remarkable epitome of positive international actor engagement (Tadjbakhsh, 2008). The United Nations, together with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), took the chief role in the conflict resolution effort. Their responsibility included but not limited to preparing the logistics and content of the negotiations, leveraging the presence of observer states, foreseeing sticking points, and generate resolutions (Abdullaev & Barned, 2001). Neighboring states such as Russian and Iran also played a big role in the process. Although some neighbors were potential spoilers of the process, their influence was defused to the benefit and expedition of the peace negotiation. They also contributed to the politics of compromise among the primary warring parties (Abdullaev & Barned, 2001).

            The widespread inclusion of the international community, however, did not guarantee a space for local stakeholders. For instance, other domestic political parties and ethnicities were not included. This proved to be detrimental later on when the Khujant forces demanded a voice in the government. Likewise, several communal groups in the north initiated uprising due to their exclusion. Tensions heightened due to the (un)intended sidelining of significant groups in the peace process. In hindsight, the Inter-Tajik was mainly Track 1 and 2, hence, only a few parties (mostly elite officials and politicians) were represented. The composition of the participants was not reflective of the diverse mass society. Civil society organizations had limited participation. Strikingly, it was mostly senior male figures who got seats at the table. Only one female, in the name of Ulfathonum Mamadshoyeva, was included from the UTO. Perhaps this is due to the Islamic norm of Tajiks. Nevertheless, the deficient inclusion practice was controversial in the peace process and affected the durability of stability.

            The Tajikistan peace process had its inherent flaws that threatened its peace and stability. Lynch (2007) illustrated the interweaved challenge related to the implementation of the general agreement and the fragility of the Tajik state and economy. In particular, the provision of legality and politics had been unfinished because of the obstacles related to power-sharing. Despite the promised 30% for UTO members, they remained marginalized in all levels of government posts. There had also been a profound dissatisfaction among the IDPs and refugees due to the lack of goods and opportunities to address their basic needs. UTO’s interests of Soviet-free legacy remained with the meddling of Russia in the post-agreement period. Of primary importance is the provision of military reform and DDR. This particular provision had gained both praises and criticisms. The next section dives deeper into this.

Reintegration, Disarmament, and Demobilization

            The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of the opposition members was supervised by the CNR during the transition period. It underwent through four stages to fully integrate former fighters. But the DDR process in Tajikistan was unconventional in a sense that it did not follow the orthodox linearity of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration at the end (Torjesen & MacFarlane, 2007). Reintegration took place before demobilization where armed groups were accepted for integration without succumbing to state authority. Ex-combatants were given positions into the military, police force and border guard forces; top leaders from the opposition were given important government seats. In total, over 6 000 combatants were recommended for service. This is not to say, however, that there were no arms surrendered. Disarmament and mobilization were partially implemented but a meager number of weapons were handed in (Torjesen, Wille, & MacFarlane, 2005). In other words, small and heavy weapons remained within the custody of their owners even after they were integrated. Despite the presidential decrees to incentivize and punish arms owners, possession of illegal arms continued to be widespread. By 1999, the government declared that the disarmament process was complete despite the deficient quantity of arms received. Today, the prevalence of small arms is still a major hurdle to stability (Heathershaw, 2005).

The efforts of the government and CNR allegedly forged trust among the commanders. In addition to the integration into military and political positions, the government facilitated vocational training programs. Some combatants were granted with income-generating projects. The active role of civil society during the reintegration process was of paramount importance, especially for the community-centered efforts. The broad-based economic programs fostered a sense of security among the ex-warriors. Furthermore, the universal amnesty and economic promises proved to be effective incentives for the commanders to continue the surrender of arms. However, the amnesty provision was mistrusted by the opposition which was one of the reasons why they were reluctant to fully give up arms. The government’s willingness to accept this partial surrender had a profound impact later on.

In spite of the seeming success of the DDR process, obstacles arose that caused risk and insecurities in Tajikistan. First, the vocational training had limited impact and was terminated when funds were depleted. Political commitment to fully make a significant impact was missing. Second, the willingness to join the military was not an easy feat for the former combatants. Some combatants were unqualified and were escorted out of the service.  As a result, former UTO members were left hanging without any protection and opportunity which was heavily criticized by the opposition leaders. Subsequently, this paved the way for the surge of crime, especially drug trafficking as an alternative option for survival and control. The government did not have a solid plan to address these drug criminal activities, hence, it proliferated rampantly. Third, spoilers would, later on, appear to fuel the drug activities. The peace process saw the minimal presence of spoilers during the negotiation which can be credited to the promised outcome of the agreement that prioritized influential (high level) commanders. In fact, as mentioned above, most of them were reserved high posts in the major ministries coupled with incentives that are almost, if not, overly luxurious (Torjesen & MacFarlane, 2007). This encouraged them (at least to some) to commit for peace. Despite this accommodation, some commanders were dissatisfied and resorted to illegal activities. Three of the notorious spoilers were Makmud Khudoiberdieve who had military skirmishes against the government; Mullo Abdullo who subscribed to goals similar that of Taliban; and Rakmon Sanginov who posed the longest challenge in the stabilization process. These individuals and splinter members of UTO were responsible for the ensuing violence. Relatedly, the challenge brought about by Uzbeks and Islamic minorities (supported by Islamic neighbors) linger on as the means to violence—the military weapons—are readily available (Karagiannis, 2006).

           

Clearly, the DDR process was problematic. Heathershaw (2009) asserted the demobilization process was forced as it was “superseded by a policy of destroying independent, non-state military commanders”. He further commented on the rent-seeking nature of the reintegration where rebels-turned-statesmen are given the power to fulfill their selfish economic interests. In fact, some commanders turned themselves into businessmen running plants and factories. Since the government authorities facilitated and agreed on this, it was difficult to question their legitimacy. As a result, corruption was rampant among high-level officials and extortion was high among the lower-level officials. The president did not respond actively to these criminal practices which perpetuated at different levels. Indeed, the DDR process of Tajikistan was an interesting one.

Conclusion

            It is easy to see why the Tajikistan peace process is considered a success by the international community. The immediate resolution and the resulting outcome seemed to have satisfied the interests of all parties. As Abullaev et al (2001) posited, the peace process changed the political fabric of the small state and promoted the art of compromise to resolve conflicts. The unusual DDR manages to appease most of the UTO influential figures. In a case of rarity, we witness how international and regional bodies were able to positively guide the process. Circumstances had also aligned to encourage the warring parties to make concessions. No doubt, the Inter-Tajik negotiation was successful in reducing inter-group hostility and achieving a state of gradual political and economic development. But zooming closer, especially to the post-agreement, presents loopholes of the process and the implementation of the agreement provisions. According to Nakibzoba, the civil war ceased but it evolved into another conflict—war to grab land, property, drug trafficking, lucrative government posts, and spheres of influence. The marginalization of UTO members in government posts still exist, despite the promise of 30% quota. And the threat of minority regional ethnic and Islamic groups persists. The half-baked transitional justice left wounds that are still fresh for those affected victims. The controversial DDR facilitated the proliferation of arms that shaped the contemporary instability caused by criminal activities, especially drug-related.

            Putting the Tajikistan peace process in a success or failure binary may overlook its unique complexities. Hence, it is imperative that one considers an objective and critical analysis of the Inter-Tajik negotiation to learn from its success and avoid its failure. A reflection among the parties (including international community) is a must to support Tajikistan and its peace process that is long-term, ongoing, and collectively shaped.

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